Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts

Sunday, February 07, 2021

A long-time China-watcher's thoughts on American diplomacy in East Asia

 Recently Juan Cole shared on his Informed Comment site an essay by Conn M. Hallinan about Biden’s foreign policy concerning China. The correct thesis of the essay was that the Biden administration’s top goal in diplomacy should be avoiding war with China, but Hallinan made made points that I thought misleading or ill-informed. This is a reaction to that article. 

Hallinan claims that a cold war with China would be impossible to win.  This assertion is highly debatable, but a cold war with China would be very destructive and is highly undesirable, so I see no point in nit-picking this claim, as I’m in agreement the main point that we ought to be trying to avoid a cold war with China. China is fully integrated into the world economy, and could play a positive role in trade and exchanges to help avert a climate catastrophe and promote the sort of economic development that would reduce global poverty, and American diplomacy ought to be structured toward achieving that sort of result.


A human rights festival in Taipei, June 4th of 2019

Hallinan claims that the Trump administration created a toxic atmosphere by targeting the Chinese Community Party (CCP) as the worldwide enemy of the United States. This is a one-sided half-truth.  The Chinese Communist Party bears much of the responsibility for any deterioration in relations with the United States. And, while the CCP is not really a “worldwide enemy” of the USA, under the current leadership of Xi Jinping, China has been behaving as a belligerent adversary, perhaps a step or two below that of an actual “enemy” in several cases. And, yes, the Trump administration used rhetoric that was hostile and toxic, and so that lack of diplomatic acumen was a disastrous part of the Trump Administration’s mishandling of our nation’s relationship with China.


Hallinan claims that Mike Pompeo “essentially called for regime change” in China (he is getting that idea from Chas Freeman), and I would call that accusation unfair.  Hallinan offers readers a link to his source for making this claim, where any reader can see what Pompeo actually said, which was: “We must also engage and empower the Chinese people — a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from the Chinese Communist Party.”  So, while Pompeo was saying our opposition to the current incarnation of the CCP must be tough, he was distinguishing this from our attitude towards the Chinese people, and pointing out that the Chinese people cannot and should not be blamed for whatever horrors the CCP commits. That doesn’t seem like a suggestion that there should be a “fight to the death” with the CCP, but that is how Hallinan (mis)characterizes Pompeo’s actual statement. To be fair to Hallinan, he seems to draw much of his understanding of the situation with China from the opinions of Chas Freeman, who has also accused Pompeo of calling for “regime change” in China. Freeman is one of the most intelligent and well-informed former diplomats who knows and understands China, and his basic premise is that our goal with China must be to make it feel secure and unthreatened, and I agree with that. With our shared premise about the importance of America taking a non-threatening approach to China, it would indeed be disastrous if American diplomats or the president did call for regime change in China, but I am not aware that this was something that the Trump administration ever did, although no doubt that administration was crazy enough to have done so. The leadership in China, however, has became extraordinarily paranoid, and leadership in the Chinese diplomatic corps may well have perceived that the USA wanted and was seeking regime change in China, whether or not that fear had any grounding in fact.


This brings up the question of whether the USA should try to deal with existing ruling powers in nations, or work to change those ruling powers.  Would it be better for the USA if the Chinese Communist Party was suddenly rejected by a coalition of dissatisfied party leaders and People’s Liberation Army generals who ordered some sort of new regime, or is it more desirable for the USA if the CCP evolves into a more benevolent party that respects human rights and ceases to threaten murderous violence against the citizens and regimes of American client states and protectorates in Asia? The CCP has done a fairly effective job of brainwashing the Chinese population into a state where many Chinese hold an ugly nationalism with a sort of Han ethnicity chauvinism and militaristic jingoism that would be extremely dangerous if China suddenly became a democracy.  I also know enough about Chinese history to fear any sort of political or military chaos in China such as it experienced in the 1920s to 1949, or at the end of the Ming Dynasty, or the ends of the other dynasties. I am in favor helping the CCP evolve to a point where it respects human rights and is committed to the United Nations’ ideals of peace, and I see no plausible and desirable alternative to that. 


The CCP is a vast organization with millions of members, and I know that it has in its ranks many idealistic and caring people who enthusiastically want to improve their country and maintain friendly relations with all peoples (I have several dear friends who are active members of the Chinese Communist Party), and no doubt there are many nationalistic Chinese in the CCP who stupidly fantasize of world domination and winning a victory in a war with the USA. America has its counterparts to these types.  The Chinese CCP has done some very horrible things in the past few decades (cultural genocide against ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, violating international law in the Spratley Islands, threatening war with Taiwan, initiating wars of border expansion against Vietnam and India, supporting the attempt of North Korea to conquer South Korea and consistently lying to the Chinese people about the nature of the Korean conflict, murderous crack-downs on non-violent protesters, violating its treaty promises to the UK in Hong Kong, etc.) and done a few good things as well (successfully reduced poverty, built a massive infrastructure to improve the lives of common Chinese citizens, etc.).  I don’t see value in arguing over how the CCP’s bad behavior compares to American atrocities, except to note that both sides have plenty to be ashamed of (among American atrocities: bombing neutral Cambodia during the war with North Vietnam, “strategic bombing”—otherwise known as the indiscriminate killing of civilians—in North Vietnam, invading and occupying Iraq, sponsoring murderous terrorists fighting legitimate governments, sponsoring violent and bloody overthrowing of democratically elected governments, supporting brutal governments that treated their citizenry in ways that were worse than what China has done internally since the 1980s, etc.). The USA and China both have plenty of blood on their hands, and the Democrats and Republicans of our country have done much evil, which can be compared to the evil done by the CCP.  The Chinese government may freely criticize America’s misbehavior, and I welcome their criticism, because the fact that an actor is imperfect has no logical bearing on the merit of  their arguments against the errors of others. The American government likewise may criticize China’s flaws, and should do so, provided such criticisms don’t make matters worse.


The problem is, under Xi Jinping, the CCP has been doing a lot more misbehaving, and so the tone of criticism has naturally been getting stronger. The rift between the governments in Washington and Beijing should not be entirely blamed on the general stupidity and incompetence of President Trump’s diplomacy. China’s behavior would have caused some degree of distancing between the two governments even under a competent and wise administration in Washington.


Hallinan points out that people in China and the United States have lower opinions of each other’s countries.  He links to an article showing that in America only 26% have a favorable view of China, whereas 66% view it negatively. Is such a massive shift in public opinion plausibly the result of Trump’s racist and antagonistic anti-Chinese rhetoric, or might actual behaviors of the Chinese government or Chinese people had something to do with it? Look at the poll Hallinan’s source referred to, and you find that the things that Americans identify as the three most significant problems for the U.S. in its relationship with China are: 1) China’s impact on the global environment; 2) Cyberattacks from China; and 3) China’s policies on human rights.  I don’t recall any of these three things being emphasized by Trump.  Trump’s main concerns seemed to be the USA's trade deficits with China or loss of U.S. jobs to China, and those are identified as “problems” by 5 percentage points to 12 percentage points fewer Americans than the three top problems I’ve mentioned. Also, the growth in strong negative feelings against China are a global phenomena, not merely an American phenomenon.  Polling by the same Pew Charitable Trust that gave us the evidence that Americans distrust China and see its government as a problem tell us that unfavorable views of China are held by 81% of Australians, 86% of Japanese, 73% of Spaniards, 75% of South Koreans, 85% of French, 73% of Canadians, and so forth.  Since only 66% of Americans have an unfavorable view of China, it hardly makes sense to argue that Trump had much to do with making Americans more distrustful or hostile towards China. On the contrary, Americans seem less hostile toward China compared with the views of citizens in other developed countries. 


And what of the views of Chinese towards America?  In China, the CCP controls the media narrative, and aside form a small minority of technically-savvy Chinese who can use VPN to look at media outside the CCP’s firewall isolating Chinese people from free exchange of facts and opinion on the internet, most people in China only know what the CCP lets them know.  So, if Chinese opinion toward foreigners and foreign nations is getting more hostile, and the Chinese sense of self is becoming more nationalistic or belligerently chauvinistic, that probably has something to do with the way the CCP is presenting the world to the population they rule.  


Hallinan offers a paragraph that is quite accurate and good, and provides readers with the best point in his essay:


Most Chinese think the U.S. is determined to isolate their country, surround it with hostile allies, and prevent it from becoming a world power. Many Americans think China is an authoritarian bully that has robbed them of well-paying industrial jobs. There is a certain amount of truth in both viewpoints. The trick will be how to negotiate a way through some genuine differences.


Yes, there are genuine differences, and negotiating through those differences is what we must do. The emphasis here is on negotiating as opposed to bullying or threatening as those approaches, with their reliance on American military force, are not good options.


Hallinan has an academic background in anthropology, rather than history, so his historical statements are not always perfectly true.  The century from 1839 to 1939 is (rightly, I think) presented as China’s century of humiliation, when it was mistreated by foreign powers, but Hallinan describes America as one of the colonial powers (like the UK, France, Japan, and Germany) that fought wars and seized ports from China in those years. The USA did engage in the extortionate punitive treatment of the Qing government after the Qing had supported anti-foreigner atrocities committed by the Boxers. Mark Twain wrote a brilliant satirical essay about this, “To the Person Sitting in Darkness,” which is my favorite anti-imperialism essay. But in general, the USA had a different sort of relationship with China compared to those other powers, and asked China to give the USA the same trading advantages it gave to any other foreign power. The USA did not attack China or seize ports as the other imperial powers did.  The relationship was also colored by the fact that many Chinese lived in the United States, and there was a long and close relationship between some American merchant capitalists from New England and some Chinese tycoons of Guangzhou. America really did have a “special” relationship with China that was significantly different from the relations of the other imperialist powers. The CCP may have tried to erase this fact from the way it tells historical narratives to its populace, and Hallinan may only care about what Chinese believe about history, rather than historical facts, since it is perceptions of history rather than actual history that is most likely to condition how people and governments behave. 


Hallinan asserts that “the Chinese have never forgotten those dark years” and I think he is only right in the literal sense the those years weren’t erased from history books.  The Chinese intellectual classes of the 1920s and 1930s had a variety of opinions about the diplomacy and conflict between the Qing Court and the Western Powers and Japan. The Nationalist Party that occupied and brutalized the people of Taiwan certainly downplayed the century of humiliation, and the CCP used to present a historical narrative about the century of humiliation that fit that era into a standard Marxist history about capitalist powers seeking to expand markets and grab resources, placing China’s position as one similar to that of Africa, India, or Latin America.  It has only been in the past two or three decades that the historical narratives about the century of humiliation have been associated with a strong nationalist sense of resentment and hostility toward the USA and European powers. That is to say, the Chinese were always angry about foreign powers pushing them around, and the weakness and inability of the Qing and Republican governments to successfully face the bullying and aggression of Japanese and European powers made many Chinese extremely xenophobic. However, until this century, the rhetoric of the Chinese Marxists who complained about foreign dominance in China used to fit into a framework that did not suggest that the Chinese people were particularly aggrieved or disadvantaged compared to other peoples of less developed nations. International worker solidarity and class consciousness was favored, and explanatory models fit into a Marxist universalism that (correctly) blamed capitalist classes in foreign lands and their allied elites in China for exploiting poor people and eroding local sovereignty as part of a universal political and economic unfolding of history. In this century, the Chinese-generated narratives have changed toward a more nationalistic and ethnocentric story emphasizing the exploitation of China and the victimization of the Chinese.  I know a bit about this because I audited a course in Chinese historiography as a doctoral student in the mid-1990s, and I’ve followed with interest the way Chinese and Taiwanese historians present their history to their publics ever since. The emphasis on China’s humiliation and the need to rise and be strong to prevent any further insults to the Chinese sense of pride and worth is a fairly new thing.  It was certainly not a central narrative in Chinese history in the 1970s or 1980s, but it does seem to be a major emphasis of China’s sense of its world situation in the past decade or two.  That is a regrettable and dangerous change. 



Hallinan claims that the Chinese have never threatened to interdict trade in the South China Sea. This is a debatable point. In 2020 the Chinese coast guard and navy have attacked and killed Vietnamese fishermen near the Parcel Islands, and in 2019 the Chinese sank a Philippines’ boat off Reed Bank and left 22 Fishermen floating in the ocean until they were picked up by a Vietnamese boat. Sinking and killing fishermen in international waters seems more serious than merely “threatening” to interdict trade.  And, of course, the authorities in Beijing have threatened to interdict trade with Taiwan, which lies at the northern boundary of the South China Sea.  When Hallinan then characterizes the Chinese authorities as being essentially non-belligerent and peaceful by pretending that they have never threatened to interdict trade in the South China Sea, he is doing so to set up Chinese behavior in contrast to American behavior, and he mentions the Malabar war games and the American strategy of “Air Sea Battle” since those do aim to prepare for cutting off Chinese trade through the South Chinese Sea. But he fails to consider under what circumstances the United States would try to cut off Chinese trade.  The only plausible circumstances in which the USA would do that would be if China were involved in aggressive wars against Korea, Japan, or Taiwan, the three American protectorates or client states in East Asia. If China would renounce the use of force or stop claiming it had a right to invade and conquer Taiwan, and if it would stop supporting the belligerent regime in North Korea, America and other powers in Asia could stop preparing to cut off China’s sea trade.  Any comment on the allegedly hostile American preparation to contain China should, in fairness, mention what China does in its military war games and diplomatic rhetoric to prepare for an attack on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.


Hallinan is right that the West needs to be sensitive to China’s insecurities.  The main point he is making is correct as far as that goes. Yet, his presentation is ignoring China’s actual violent belligerence in the South China Sea, and its threats to use violence against its East Asian neighbors, and that is an error.


I think Hallinan is largely informed by the opinions of Chas Freeman, who was one of three American translators during Nixon’s famous 1972 visit to China.  Freeman is a brilliant diplomat, well-connected in China and Taiwan, who expresses many opinions about America’s foreign policy, and I agree with the vast majority of what he says.  Chas Freeman is very good at expressing the Chinese view of the situation related to Taiwan (his December 17, 2020 talk “War with China over Taiwan” will give you an idea of how Freeman sees the situation). Usually when Freeman expresses opinions I disagree with, I perceive he has become so empathetically understanding of the CCP’s view (which is a good trait in a diplomat) that he has taken the Chinese view as his own (which is the source of my disagreement with him, I think).  As Hallinan and Freeman see the situation, the U.S. has abrogated agreements our diplomats and leaders made with China in 1972, 1978, 1979, and 1982.  China also made some assurances in those agreements, and Hallinan and Freeman emphasize how American foreign policy has violated the spirit of those agreements without saying much about how the Chinese have violated those agreements. I assume Freeman doesn’t examine those because he is interested in realpolitik and considers the only important issue is how China perceives the situation, rather than what the situation actually is or was. For example, China believes that there has been a consensus among China, the USA, and Taiwan that there is only one China and there cannot be a two states for one country solution to the problem of the “division” of China. When the KMT ruled Taiwan as a dictatorship and an occupying Chinese regime bullying the local Taiwanese population, the KMT did agree with China on that view, and it was at that time (the 1960s and 1970s) that Chas Freeman came to understand Taiwan and China, and make his friendships with elites and leadership in both countries. The KMT is no longer in power in Taiwan, and when they are in power they do not rule in a dictatorship, and so the government in Taiwan has changed, and no longer represents a Chinese government-in-exile that seeks reunification with the Chinese motherland. 


Hallinan suggests that both countries should dial down the rhetoric and de-escalate their military deployments.  That is actually good advice. He also suggests that Beijing should give up its claims in the South China Sea and disarm the bases it has illegally established there.  That is also good advice, although there are other solutions that would not require this (for example, setting up the Spratleys and Parcel Islands in a situation like that of Andorra where multiple countries hold a form of joint-sovereignty over a region, or share mutual responsibilities for protecting a common resource).  He should also suggest that China re-affirm its agreements made in 1979 and 1982 that it will not seek to reunify with Taiwan through violent force.  China has broken its treaty with the UK about the treatment of institutions and the population in Hong Kong. China’s threat to violently attack and murder thousands of Taiwanese for the frivolous sake of national pride and unity, to conquer Taiwan, also conflicts with the understandings reached with the United States in 1979 and 1982.


One thing that might help the situation with Taiwan and China is for the Taiwanese government to make several suggestions for how reunification could be achieved on Taiwan’s terms.  These could be creative solutions, and there ought to be several suggestions.  One approach would be to suggest forms of reunion in which the two states became allies and partners in a system of equal power-sharing, where any changes in the relationship could be vetoed by either side. There could also be clauses in the reunification treaty that would allow either side to become independent from the other if there was a violation of some agreement.  For example, each side might keep its own military, and if either side used its military in the other’s territory for purposes other than humanitarian relief or coordinated mutual defense, that would trigger the dissolution of the unified state. Some sort of a confederation solution might be found that finds a middle-ground between the unification of the American states into the USA (too much unification for Taiwan) and the confederation of the members of the European Union (not enough unification for China).  Taiwan needs to make these sorts of suggestions and engage with China in discussions about the sort of reunification that would appeal to the Taiwanese (reunifications in which there would be no possibility of the CCP or PLA eroding the rights or democratic institutions in Taiwan as they have done in Hong Kong) in order to take from the CCP any sort of excuse for launching the terrible efforts of a violent conquest of Taiwan. A treaty of confederation between Taiwan and the PRC might begin with an idealistic preamble pointing out the advantages of nations and peoples binding their countries together close enough to make violent conflict unthinkable, but allowing local sovereignty and self-determination so that large nations cannot interfere in smaller nations, extolling the virtue of diverse approaches to the basic problems of governance and securing stability, justice, and flourishing civilizations.   Humanity needs to try out many different policies and approaches and seek out methods that seem most desirable for creating flourishing and stable societies, but humanity also needs governments to surrender a certain amount of sovereignty in order to prevent inter-state warfare. A treating binding Taiwan and China together could offer the confederation as a model  for potential unification of Asia, and then eventually unification of the planet. References could be made to the successes of the European Union, NATO, and various long-standing mutual defense alliances and peaceful neighborly relations among nations. If Taiwan is continuously suggesting such agreements, and China is always rejecting them, this would create a better situation than one in which Taiwan seems to only want to follow a path toward independence without any dialog with China.


The dream of Taiwan simply being a normal independent country like Japan or South Korea is not plausible because the CCP will not accept that, and neither Taiwan nor the USA can afford a war with China.  The CCP’s dream of conquering Taiwan or taking over Taiwan the way it took over Hong Kong is equally impossible, because the people of Taiwan do not want it and would violently resist, and the United States cannot afford to have a client state or protectorate forcibly conquered by China.  There are other solutions between those two unacceptable extremes. We do not need to wait for China to give up its claims to have a right to conquer Taiwan (the Chinese use the euphemism “reunification”), or persuade it to do so. Exploring other solutions that could be acceptable to Taiwanese, and offering such solutions to the CCP on a regular basis, would at least get the leadership of the CCP to ponder some sort of reunification that would give the Beijing government the minimum it desires (the ability to claim it has successfully reunified China and greater security of its territorial integrity) while not actually giving it any significant power to dominate or interfere in Taiwanese sovereignty. The Chinese are naturally pragmatic, and if discussion and diplomacy begins in earnest toward some sort of agreement for a confederation, the Taiwanese and Americans might have a chance of waiting out the current belligerent Xi Jinping regime and getting a more pragmatic and conciliatory successor regime after Xi to negotiate in good faith and accept some accommodation with Taiwan. 


Protestors outside the Executive Assembly during Taipei’s Sunflower Protest Movement, 2014

While China continues to be belligerent and violent in its pursuit of territorial expansion in the South China Sea and dominance of Asia, it is necessary for the United States to cooperate with other Asian powers to constrain and blunt this aggression, but American diplomacy cannot merely take a role as China’s opposition or enemy in Asia. On the contrary, American diplomacy requires a break-through in which China can see its self-interest furthered through a friendly partnership with its Asian neighbors and the United States, and this requires America and its friends in Asia to offer China various alternatives to the present highly confrontational situation in East Asia, and especially across the Formosan Straits.  


Another approach to China would be some sort of an entente or mutual defense alliance among the major Asian players aside from China. The USA would need to put together this agreement among Japan, Taiwan, the USA, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Indonesia, and India, with all agreeing that China has disputes with some of these nations (Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Philippines) about sovereignty in the Spratley and Parcel Islands, about borders (with India and Vietnam, and Japan), and about sovereignty (with Taiwan). The nations would commit to an intention to see all these disputes with China resolved peacefully in ways that are acceptable to China and to all the partners.  The partners would agree that violent military confrontation by China to force its way in any of these disputes would be unacceptable, and would be met by a unified defensive action. It would not be good to only agree to defend against Chinese aggression; it would be necessary for the entente agreement to recognize that these disputes create insecurity, and everyone wants to see these disputes resolved, and the only plausible resolution of these disputes is to see solutions in which both China and its neighbors peacefully find compromise and agreement.


Whatever happens in Asian international relations, two principles ought to be recognized by the United States and incorporated into its diplomatic posture.  The first of these is that American values recognize the philosophical principle that all lives are of equal value, and given the equal value of human lives, the largest Asian nations of China and India, and to a lesser extent Indonesia, have something like a “natural” right to take a leadership role in the international order in Asia. This needs to be acknowledged to assure China that the USA accepts its role as a natural leader in Asia (but not “the” natural leader).  The United States would thus recognize that China has a certain degree of responsibility and some degree of an inherent right to sometimes lead the diplomatic fashioning of a peaceful order in Asia. The corollary principle that must accompany this stance based on the equal value of human life is the principle that each nation has a right to independent sovereignty and freedom from unwanted interference from larger states.  Thus, states with smaller populations, such as Mongolia, Timor-Leste, and Bhutan have a right to security where they are free from aggression and dominance by their larger neighbors, and whatever order of international relations emerges must protect the independence and sovereignty of smaller states. The United States also ought to emphasize that the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Sustainable Development Goals that emerged from the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012,  the goals of the COP21 Paris Climate Conference and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction express the shared goals of all governments, and central to all these agreements are the  principles that governments have a duty to improve the lives of people and protect humanity from the horrors of war. And, thus, all states should join to secure peace and stop any power from using warfare as a tool to settle disputes. This can be emphasized as a way of demonstrating that the same principles that guide American diplomacy to prevent the CCP from using military conquest to subjugate the peoples of Taiwan or take control over islands in the South China sea that actually belong to Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines also guide American diplomacy to honor China’s right to leadership and power in international relations.


What do I know about Asia? I have visited and briefly lived in China four times. I visited friends there in the summer of 1992 for not quite two weeks, studied Chinese in Xi’an in the summer of 1994 for about seven weeks, visited Shanghai for the World Fair for a bit less than two weeks in 2010, and was a short-term exchange scholar at Heilongjiang University in Harbin for nearly two months in the late spring of 2012.  I have also lived in Taiwan or visited it for extended periods off an on since 1990, accumulating about four years of my life living in Taiwan. I have many friendships with Chinese from a variety of walks of life, and I remain in contact with about a dozen Chinese citizens, all of whom I dearly cherish as friends. I have been married to a woman from Taiwan for nearly 30 years, and count Taiwanese citizens among my closest and most intimate friends.  I have had a scholarly interest in China since the early 1980s in my adolescence, and over the past 40 years I have read scores of scholarly and popular books and articles on many aspects of Chinese history and society.  I’m not a China expert, but I’m fairly well-informed about China, and very well informed about Taiwan. My Chinese language skills are intermediate, and I’m working on building them up toward fluency.



Sunday, May 01, 2011

Abbottabad seems like a nice place

Well, I wonder if anyone I know has recently been in Abbottabad.  Seems like a nice place to visit, or just hide out and get away from the world.  They have a medical college there for women.  Oh, there was a report of a helicopter crash there at night, evidently on May 1st, and the sound of gunfire.

I'm sorry the correspondents on CBS and ABC I was watching tonight listed terrorist attacks and only mentioned ones against American targets (embassies, naval vessels, the 9-11 attacks), and didn't mention attacks in Madrid, London, or the many, many attacks in Iraq, and even attacks in Saudi Arabia, or perhaps they could have mentioned the attack in Mumbai.  This creed of terrorism has been a global phenomena.  They should have interviewed survivors of attacks whose family members were killed by "al-Qaeda in Iraq" as well as the American survivors of such attacks. The American news media is so hopelessly within a bubble in which only America matters.  'Abdu'l-Baha commented on this when it visited North America.

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Remembering September 11, 2001

In one of my on-line courses we were discussing how major historical events have influenced, and most of the participants in this course mentioned the events of September 11, 2001. I remember in the morning as I cooked my breakfast and listened to NPR, and heard that a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center towers. I had no television, and I knew about the plane that flew into the Empire State Building many years ago, so I went off to campus and began my class as if nothing much special was happening, but my students were highly agitated, and one of them asked if we were really going to have class, given what had happened in New York. I was astonished that they would be so worked up about an airplane (I supposed it must have been a small aircraft) crashing into a skyscraper. At noon, when the class ended, there was a message on my office phone from my father, telling me that my sister and brother-in-law were safe (they were investment bankers in New York City, and sometimes went to meetings in the World Trade Center, and in fact one of my brother-in-law's best friends was killed that day). I called to ask my dad what was up, and when he told me the towers had collapsed I responded with something like, "you mean they collapsed from the top down to where the airplane hit them, right? because those towers are made of steel, and I don't think they could just collapse because an airplane hit them." I still hadn't seen any pictures.

The American response to this crime has been very significant in shaping all our lives since then. The wars, the waste, the mismanagement, the fear, and so forth has been very much what I feared we would have. A state of permanent war. But I've been impressed by how good America has been about distinguishing between the cultists and the mainstream. I see Osama bin-Laden and the theologians and strategists around him to be very much the same type as David Koresh, Jim Jones, and Chizuo Matsumoto (Shoko Ashahara), and I think most Americans recognize that our Muslim neighbors have nothing to do with terrorists like Osama bin-Laden (no more than Christians had anything to do with Timothy McVeigh). I must admit I'm glad the Taliban don't rule in Afghanistan, and I'm pleased that Saddam Husayn and his government met the fate that seemed appropriate, but the costs have been overwhelming in treasure and in blood, and the research I've seen suggests our mismanaged campaigns have caused excess deaths in the Middle East and Central Asia at two orders of magnitude over what we suffered nine years ago. I remember in 2002 protesting and holding a sign I'd made saying something like, "When we bomb there will be collateral damage and civilian dead. How is that different from what terrorists do?" My anger at the military and political leadership that has fought these wars badly is like my feelings about Abraham Lincoln's early generals. They're a bad lot, and a disgrace.

Saturday, November 22, 2008

Putin and Arnolfini, Separated at Birth?




It it just my imagination, or does Vladimir Putin bear a strong resemblance to Giovanni Arnolfini? Putin doesn't have the cleft chin, and his eyes aren't so hooded, but look at these images and see what you think.

Friday, November 07, 2008

Submit your ideas to the Obama Administration

You can go to the new Change.gov website and submit suggestions. Presumably, volunteers and campaign staff catalog and index the suggestions, and pass on some sort of summary with representative sample posts to Obama himself.

I've submitted a few of my own suggestions. I might as well share them here.

Suggestion Submission #1. Foreign Aid and Cultural Exchange.

You know Kenya. I've lived there one semester myself, and lived in Kibera, where I understand you have stayed--I had some Luo friends, too. You, better than any president we've ever had, understand the material poverty of the money-poor nations.

The key thing to do is to meet our promise from the Monterrey Consensus to devote about 0.7% of our GNP to international aid to the poorest nations. That aid should be mainly devoted to developing infrastructure, education, and health care provision in the materially poor world. It should be targeted to nations that have the greatest political transparency and show signs of moving toward democracy and independent institutions of civic society.

Foreign aid of this nature should rightfully be considered a matter of national defense, and so we ought to take the increase in international aid from our bloated and wasteful defense budget.
If as part of this policy we establish more American-supported public universities in poorer regions of the world I would volunteer to serve.

As a supplement to this dramatic increase in development aid we should make a massive effort to increase direct public exchange between America and poorer nations. We should be sending 100,000 American high school students and college students abroad each year, and bringing in a similar number of foreign students for cultural and educational exchanges. Thousands more Americans fluent in Mandarin, Arabic, Spanish, Pashtun, and Swahili, (with friends in the lands where those languages are the native or second language) will be worth more to us in helping America maintain peace and security than tens of thousands of more monolingual soldiers.

Make the foreign exchanges part of the foreign aid increase policy. Send American kids from the poor and violent environments to do a year of education and service in an entirely different environment (orphanages in Zambia, for example), and you can imagine the kind of changes we would witness.


Suggestion Submission #2. Higher Education Affordability.

Make higher education affordable. Establish some sort of target costs of providing higher education and some federal guidelines of fair cost-sharing between the public (we all benefit from having better quality higher education that is affordable in our society) and the college students (who reap more direct benefits than the taxpayers who never go to college or finish their college degrees). For example, it seems to me that costs of college education ought to be split with students paying about a third of the cost of their education and the public paying nearly 2/3rds (with alumni donations and private grants used to fund non-educational expenses). Further, costs of education ought to be indexed to median-full-time-year-round wages of the previous year and tuition at public institutions ought to be set on a sliding-scale.
Public universities and the states that control them work out the details of spending and tuition rates, but the federal government can dictate certain broad principles of how public education ought to be funded and priced. The National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy, the Department of Education, and other federal government organs ought to have policies of only giving grants to researchers at universities that follow federal suggested guidelines for pricing education. Only states that follow guidelines in keeping college costs under control ought to receive federal financial aid for higher education.

Costs of college have nearly doubled in real inflation-adjusted terms since I attended college in the 1980s, but median and mean faculty salaries have declined by approximately 11% over the same 20-30 year period. The problem has reached a point where I could earn more money by leaving my job at the University of Illinois and taking a job in the local public school system as a high school teacher! I'm working 50-60 hours each week trying to help my undergraduate and graduate students get a good education, but even though I've been saving 5% of my income for my two sons for their college fund since they were born, I will be unable to afford to pay for more than two years of their college education, even if they attend the university where I myself teach! My salary and our household income match almost exactly the state median year-round-full-time wage and median household income, so I know that most people in Illinois are in a situation like mine in terms of being unable to afford to send their children to college.

State governments are unwilling to make affordable higher education a priority. Please use the federal government to force the state governments into taking action on this issue.


Suggestion Submission #3. Change the Economic Debate.

People in America need to understand some basics about economics and tax policies and government spending. Someone (the president) needs to clearly explain that we as a society want a public sector that protects and empowers us. We are empowered by education, by infrastructure, and by policies that give us freedom from financial ruin (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, national health insurance policies, etc.). We are protected by national defense, by police and fire departments, by environmental standards and various workplace and financial regulations. Just lay it all out; if the American people want a certain level of protection and empowerment they'll need to contribute an average of some percentage of their incomes to public spending, through some mix of property/wealth taxes, income-and-gains taxes, and sales-consumption taxes. When you combine the costs of public services from local, state, and federal governments and look at the total income and wealth of America it seems like about 40% (give or take 10 percentage points) of the national economy needs to be cycled through the public sector of taxing and spending.

Most of the arguments about fiscal policies and taxing and spending are between conservative Republicans who want fewer public services and less protection and empowerment, and are therefore willing to live in a society where about 35% of the national economy gets cycled through the public taxing-spending cycle, and those who want more protection and empowerment, and therefore want 45% to 50% of the economy cycled through the public sphere.

Make it clear that we have a consensus where everyone in the mainstream, from the most liberal Democrat to the most conservative Republican agrees that we like economic growth and we want a strong private for-profit sector of the economy to serve as the engine of growth. No one disputes that, but we just disagree about whether that sector of the economy ought to be 30% or 40% or 50% of the national economy. Our differences come mainly from how much empowerment and protection we want from the public sector, and how far we trust ourselves and our private for-profit and non-profit sectors to provide security and empowerment when the government's public sphere isn't doing it.

We need to return to a New Deal style consensus about public spending and taxation in this nation, and so we need to destroy these pernicious myths that there is something wrong with a little bit of income transfer and redistribution of freedom-wealth-income-security from the most fortunate to the rest of us. We need to make it clear that the government is in the business of empowering and protecting, and distributing freedom and opportunity. Yes, there are some inefficiencies in the public sphere, but we can make government efficient and responsive. Taxation can be a good thing. There are fair degrees of taxation. Public spending is a good thing. There are desirable and sustainable levels of public spending. Taxing and spending aren't the problem. The problem comes when taxing is too high, relative to the benefits that are received. Taxation is a problem when the government is very inefficient in delivering empowerment and protection at levels expected from such taxation. Taxing is a problem when so much of the economy is swallowed in the public sector that the private sector shrinks and growth slows down too far. So long as the government is efficient and taxing hasn't ruined the private sector it's okay to tax and spend.

We need to make this clear and understood. It's really basic civics and economics, but the way the Republicans were using the Joe-the-Plumber story and framing the issue as socialism shows that a certain segment of this nation is entirely ignorant of basic concepts underlying our democracy and modern economies. This worries me, as such ignorance leads to ideological fanaticism stripped of knowledge and understanding, and I associate such political attitudes with failures of civil society.

Please, President-Elect Obama, use your position to educate Americans about taxation and some basics of macroeconomics. Help us re-frame the debate about taxing and spending. Help change the poisonous climate of empty hate-filled rhetoric to a situation where people have reasonable disagreements about spending priorities and program efficiencies.

Friday, September 05, 2008

Why did Russia Invade Georgia?

A friend asked why I thought Russia invaded Georgia. First of all, although we say, "Russia invaded Georgia" what we really mean is that some units of the Russian military entered Georgia's territory and destroyed things and killed people. It wasn't the whole Russian nation that did this, but some soldiers, who took orders from the government, and I don't know how representative the Russian government is of Russia as a whole. It seems to me the Russian government keeps a pretty tight control on what Russian people know about the world, and shapes domestic opinion in such a way that it's difficult to know what Russian people would really want or do if they knew what people outside of Russia know. Also, nations and governments are made up of thousands of people with thousands of different opinions and values and motives. When a country does something like send units of its military into another country, there will be various reasons for this, and some of the generals or political leaders that ordered the intervention or invasion will have quite different motives or understandings than their colleagues. But, that said, here are reasons I suppose Russians decided to send some military units into Georgia, going as far as Gori (a city I've actually visited, in 1985).

1st. The Russians must maintain credibility with their allies, and the South Ossetians are their allies, so they had to respond to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia.
2nd. The Russians desire that South Ossetia will gain its independence or perhaps join with North Ossetia as part of the Russian Federation, and so they want to stop Georgia from daring to exert control over South Ossetia.
3rd. The Russians feel a moral obligation to protect ethnic groups they perceive to be oppressed. From the Russian point of view, the South Ossetians are oppressed by the Georgians, and so they must punish the Georgians for attacking South Ossetia. (Some Russians see the South Ossetians the way some Americans see the Kosovo Albanians, the Tibetans, or the persecuted minorities in Sudan).
4th. Certain figures in the Russian government and military wanted to make a demonstration of strength to demonstrate that Russia is still a powerful country. This is mainly for domestic consumption, to keep up Russian loyalty to the elites who control Russia, but it is also a communication to nations around Russia, that they must be careful in their diplomatic and military actions, because Russia is not afraid to intervene (or invade). In essence, the invasion of Georgia was a morale booster for Russia and a way to intimidate other countries.
5th. Russian political elites wanted to stop NATO from enlarging, and wanted to show that if NATO included states too close to Russia that have unresolved diplomatic problems, this could draw NATO and Russia into military conflict. The Russian elites expect that this will make the NATO elites reconsider extending NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia.
6th. Russian elites have a intuitive hatred of the current administration in Georgia, and were eager to attack Georgia to destabilize it and drive its current administration out of power.

I think the domestic morale booster rationale should be ranked pretty high. Also, the humans running the Russian government and military are vulnerable to the same irrational hubris and short-sightedness that plagued American elites who decided we would fight a certain sort of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It's old world thinking.

Now for my opinion of the whole thing. It's ridiculous to fight over land. The desire of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians for independence from Georgia is not comparable to the desire of the Confederate States of America for independence. There is no ideological bond or historical reason why those little enclaves should be part of either Georgia or the Russian Federation. The fact that those people find themselves within the borders of one or the other administrative state hardly matters, and certainly isn't worth a bloody war. If Russia can get independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this would set an interesting precedent for Tibet, where people would like greater independence or autonomy from China. I think northeastern Sri Lanka where the Tamils want greater autonomy or independence, Kashmir, and some of the provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo could all point to what happened in Kosovo and what may happen in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ask, "why not here for us?"

Also, I wonder if Russia's government's desire to remove Georgia's Saakashvili from power is similar to the American government's desire to remove such political leaders as Manuel Noriega in Panama (1989), Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003), Jacobo Arbenz Gusmán in Guatemala (1954), Mohammed Mosaddeq in Iran (1953), Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (1961), Dgo No Dingh Diem in South Vietnam (1963), Salvador Allende in Chile (1973), or Bernard Coard and Hudson Austin in Grenada (1983). Noriega, Hussein, Diem, and Austin were bad guys, and I'm glad someone removed them from power. But Gusmán, Allende, Mosaddeq, and Lumumba weren't so bad at all, and it's a crime that our government had a hand in stripping them of power (and in some cases, having them killed). I think Russia is behaving as the United States did in these sorts of situations, and with Saakashvili I think we have a leader who is flawed but overall pretty good (like Lumumba or Allende), not a bad guy like Austin or Hussein or Noriega. So Russia is blameworthy the way the United States was when it waged an undeclared war against Nicaragua in the 1980s. The Georgians (like the Sandanistas in Nicaragua) are not saints, and they deserve harsh criticism for some of their actions (especially the murderous attack on South Ossetians that triggered the Russian invasion), but the response by Russia, like America's foreign policy in the 1980s, is wrong.

But it's difficult to say. I don't follow Georgian or Russian politics. I have my hands full keeping track of developments in Iraq. Recently the Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani called al-Maliki's government "totalitarian" and I'm worried about what the Peshmerga might do in Kirkuk. And did anyone notice that very few (hardly any) of the Awakening Council tribal leaders attended the handover of al-Anbar in Ramadi? I think the Iraqi Islamic Party was behind the (temporary) ouster of al-Anbar police chief Major General Tareq Youssef al A'sal al Dulaimi. I think this means the Iraqi Accord Front is going to try to rig the 2009 elections where they can, and that could be disastrous.

Thursday, July 20, 2006

Hadley-Ives family update

Hadley-Ives family update

I just sent a letter to my U.S. Rep and Senators about the Israeli-Lebanon conflict:

I feel as I'm sure most Americans do, that the so-called "Hezbollah" (if God does favor a party, certainly they aren't it) represents evil and terrorism. I hope Israel is successful in inflicting tremendous casualties upon the so-called "Hezbollah" fighters and leaders, and I wish Israel success in that respect.

However, I'm writing because I think the Israeli Defense Forces are going crazy. Why are they killing Lebanese regular army guys? I thought Israel claimed it wanted the regular Lebanese army to exert more control over the so-called "Hezbollah." Also, I can't understand this bombing of water-drilling trucks in a Christian area of Beruit. And what is going on with bombing whole villages and hamlets, destroying all the homes and houses? Maybe some of these homes are military targets because the so-called "Hezbollah" uses them, but surely other homes are inhabited by innocent civilians.

I fear that Israel is sinking to the same level of evil and wickedness as the so-called "Hezbollah". When the so-called "Hezbollah" shoots unguided missiles at Israeli cities, that is a war crime. When Israeli Defense Forces bomb civilian infrastructure in Lebanon and indiscriminately kill civilians and terrorists together without using surgical strikes, that is also probably a war crime.

I want the U.S. government to make this clear to Israel. I want you to let the Israeli ambassador know how concerned your constituents back in Illinois are about this. How can Israel ever achieve security and peace with its neighbors if it does such bloody work? A strong military response to the so-called "Hezbollah" is understandable, and I'd support it, but what we're seeing instead is total madness. And if America goes on defending this particular Israeli craziness we'll be hated even more.

So I'm pleading with you to support any House resolution that calls on Israel to show restraint and focus its military actions against the so-called "Hezbollah" and refrain from committing war crimes such as bombing civilian areas that are of no military value to the terrorists.