Sunday, December 14, 2014

Seven Valleys

   《七谷經》堪稱巴哈歐拉在神秘主義創作方面的最高成就。這部意蘊深邃的傑作是為回答哈奈根的法官謝赫·穆哈伊丁·伊本的提問而寫的。哈奈根是伊拉克鄰近波斯的一市鎮,位於巴格達的東北面。該法官顯然是一位蘇非主義哲學家的學生。蘇非主義是伊斯蘭教多種神秘思潮的泛稱,盛行於一時,且影響至今。蘇非的宗旨在於,通過默思、祈禱、冥想和達到心醉神迷的狀態等方式覲見上帝。它發展出一套專門的用語來解釋靈性進步的各個階段。一些蘇非相信,他們能夠直接親近上帝,無需穆罕默德或其他先知的幫助。如此觀點在邏輯上自然會推導出這樣的信條:蘇非不受宗教律法的約束,對他們——即便不是很多——而言,個人內心的良知才是穩妥的嚮導。波斯最偉大的神秘主義者哲拉魯丁·魯米與安薩里對此持有爭議,他們斷言,唯有通過服從上帝使者所啟示的律法,才能達到上帝臨在的境界。

謝赫·穆哈伊丁·伊本本人無疑熟知十二世紀波斯蘇非派人物法里德丁·阿塔爾。阿塔爾最受推崇的著作是《百鳥朝鳳》。在該書中,靈魂進步之旅分為“七谷”:探尋,愛,知識,超脫,合一,迷惘,消亡。而在波斯文啟示的《七谷經》裡,巴哈歐拉使用了類似而非完全相同的方式描述了靈魂朝向其存在的目標前進的七個階段。巴哈歐拉是在離開隱居的蘇萊曼尼亞山區返回巴格達後啟示這部著作的。它的主旨基本上無涉時間和空間,揭示了宗教的內在真義。靈性的實質在各大宗教裡都是相同的,它們共同構成了信仰的根基。巴哈歐拉對其信仰作有如此闡明:“此乃上帝不變之信仰,永恆於過往,永生於未來。”

《四谷經》晚於《七谷經》,同樣啟示於巴哈歐拉流放巴格達時期。它是寫給伊拉克庫爾德斯坦地區基爾庫克的博學之士謝赫·阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼的。 《四谷經》闡述了發現那不可見者的四種方法,人心的四個層級,以及尋求所傾慕者——那配受讚美者、吸引者、受愛戴者——的四種神秘行者。該經所描述的四種神聖狀態源於《古蘭經》(第五十七章第3節):“祂是首與末,是顯者與隱者;祂知曉萬物。”

小羅伯特·L.久利克
一九七五年二月一日



七谷經



奉寬宏、仁慈上帝之名!

讚美歸於上帝!祂令實有自虛無中呈現;將先存隱秘銘刻於人之碑碣;教諭他未曾知曉的神聖宣說之奧妙;令他成為已信者及臣服者的明晰之書;使他在此黑暗與衰敗時代見證萬物之創造, 並在非凡聖殿裡自永生之巔以奇妙之音道出——最終,人人皆能以其主之顯示者的身份獨自親身見證:誠然,除祂之外,別無上帝;人人皆因此而能奮力攀登那實在之巔,直到目空一切,惟見上帝。

[...見證萬物之           Kullu Shay’(庫勒謝)。]
[並在非凡聖殿        喻指 顯聖或顯聖者(the Manifestation)。]  


我亦讚美和頌揚從那神聖本質之洋分出的首片大海,自那一體之境閃耀的初道曙光,在那永恆之天升起的首輪太陽,被那獨一燈塔的先存之燈點燃的頭道火焰:祂乃尊貴者王國之艾哈邁德,親近者眾靈之穆罕默德,誠摯者領地之馬哈茂德。在知祂者的心中,“祂享有至偉之諸名號……無論你們以何種名號祈求祂。”願祂的眷屬及同伴享得充分、長久和永恆的安寧!

[  ...哈邁德        Aḥmad,同艾哈默德,穆罕默德在《古蘭經》裡的名稱。 ——譯註 ]
[  ...哈茂德        Maḥmúd,公元971-1030在世,伽色尼王朝素丹(蘇丹),著名軍事家,一譯“馬默德”。穆罕默德、艾哈邁德和馬哈茂德均為先知的名字和稱號,派生自動詞“讚美”和“頌揚”。 ——譯註]

再者,我已聽聞知識夜鶯在你生命之樹的枝頭上鳴唱,獲知確信之鴿在你心田之蔭的枝杈上高歌。誠然,我確已吸納你愛之衣飾的純淨芳香,並經由詳閱惠函而達至與你確然心照神會。你提及自己捨身於上帝並藉祂獲得新生,說起自己對上帝所鍾愛者、祂的諸名號之各個顯示及祂的諸屬性呈現之處的愛,我對此已加留意,故而,我自榮光聖界向你顯露神聖而輝煌之標誌,召喚你進入那神聖、親近和華美之天庭,引領你到達如此境界:視大千世界為空,惟見自己所愛戴之尊榮者的聖容;當受造萬生為無,一如其前世之莫名。

對此,那一體之夜鶯已於高西耶園唱出。他說:“你的心碑上將出現如此玄妙之神秘文字——‘敬畏真主吧,祂會授你知識。'你的靈魂之鳥亦將回憶起先世之聖殿,以渴望之翼翱翔於'走你的主走過的路'之天宇,在'而後以各類果實為食'之諸花園裡採擷共享之果。”
[  高西耶園       the garden of Ghawthíyyih,出自阿里的佈道。]


朋友啊,我憑生命起誓!這些果實產自知識領地的這些花樹之青園,你若借助名號與屬性諸鏡裡炫目的神聖本質之光將之品嚐,思慕之情便會從你手中奪去耐心與忍隱之韁繩,使你的靈魂隨那閃耀之光顫栗,將你從塵世家園領到實質中心裡的第一神聖居所,且將你提升至如此境界:翱翔天際,如行大地;健步水上,如履平川。倘若如此,我、你、凡登臨知識天堂者乃至其生命之園受到來自萬恩者示巴的確信之風吹拂而心靈復甦者,必為之歡喜。


[自萬恩者示巴              Sheba, 舊譯賽百或賽伯,猶太教和伊斯蘭教傳說中的王國,象徵安居之地或家園,位於阿拉伯半島西南。據《聖經·舊約》記載,所羅門王在位期間,示巴女王曾親率駝隊前去拜見他。 《古蘭經》亦有她會見所羅門王情形的描述。而據北非另一種傳說,示巴嫁給所羅門王,其子曼涅里克一世創建了所羅門王朝。 ——譯註]

循正道者,必得安寧!

此外,行者由凡塵居所達至天上家園之旅程,有“七階段”一說,亦有謂“七谷”或“七城”者。他們說,若非棄絕自我,歷經這些階段,行者便絕無可能抵達那親近和團聚之洋,亦無法暢飲那絕世佳釀。首階段乃是...

探寻之谷



本谷所需之坐騎乃是毅力;若無毅力,本旅程之行者便無處可至,無的可達。他決不可心灰氣餒;縱然經年累月艱苦跋涉,仍未一瞻那聖友之美,亦絕不該躊躇畏縮。因為,凡尋求“為我們”之“克爾白”者,皆因此佳音而欣喜:“我會在我的道上引導他們。”在探尋過程中,他們決然奉獻,厲兵秣馬,時刻嘗試由疏失之境進入生命之域。無束縛可阻礙他們,無勸言可製止他們。

[凡尋求“為我們”之“克爾白”者       [Ka’bih,位於麥加的聖所,這裡意指“目標”。]]
[“我會在我的道上引導他們。”  [《古蘭經》:“無論誰為我作出努力,我都會在我的道上引導他們。”]]


這些僕人義當清除心中的一切痕跡,因為心靈乃是神聖財富之源;義當杜絕模仿,即重蹈先祖前輩遺轍,對天下眾生閉合友好與敵意之門。


在本旅程中,尋者會抵達如此階段:他看見所有受造物都在四處遊蕩、意亂情迷之中尋找那聖友。他會看到:奮力追逐其約瑟之雅各何其之多!他將目睹:急切找尋所愛戴者之愛人何其之眾!他將見證:苦苦尋覓其屬意者之慕求者何其之盛!每一刻,他都有一重大發現;每一時,他都知悉一隱藏奧秘;因為他的心已離開兩個世界,向所愛戴者之克爾白進發。每一步,他都將得到來自無形聖域的扶助,他的求索熱度亦隨之彌增。

[奋力追逐其约瑟之雅各…    Jacob,又名以色列,希伯來人的祖先,以色列人傳統以他為本民族的祖先。 《聖經·舊約》稱他是以東人的祖先以掃的孿生弟弟。在前往亞蘭人部落途經伯特利時得到上帝的特別啟示,後來返回巴勒斯坦並再次得到上帝的啟示。約瑟(Joseph)為其子。晚年期間,雅各率眾子逃荒至埃及,投奔已在那裡的約瑟。後死在埃及,葬在巴勒斯坦,在《古蘭經》中,雅各被稱作葉爾孤白,據麥加古本載,葉爾孤白是易卜拉欣(亞伯拉罕)的兒子;是易司哈各(以撒)的哥哥而非其子。 ——譯註]



尋者須以愛之馬季農的標準來衡量其探尋。據說,有一日,他們看見馬季農一邊篩土,一邊落淚。他們問:“你在做什麼?”他回答說:“我在找蕾莉。”他們驚叫道:“哎呀,蕾莉可是純潔之靈啊,你竟然在塵土裡尋找她!”他說: “我無處不尋,只要能找到她,哪怕走遍海角天涯。”

[尋者須以愛之馬季農....  Majnún,字面意思為“瘋狂”。原為古波斯和古阿拉伯一著名情聖的稱謂, 其所愛者名叫蕾莉(Laylí),是一位阿拉伯王子的女兒。他們相愛的故事象徵著近乎神聖的人間真愛,成為很多波斯浪漫詩篇的主題,尤以尼扎米寫於公元1180-1189年的最為著名。]


誠然,智者不屑於在塵土裡尋找萬主之主,但馬季農的話語卻表明其探尋熱忱的熾烈程度。 “凡懷熱情尋覓者,必得所願。”     [阿拉伯諺語。]


真尋者唯其探尋目標是求,別無他顧;愛者只渴求與所愛戴者團聚,別無他意。若非捨棄一切,尋者無可如願。亦即,他須無視自己所見、所聞、所悟之一切,方能進入靈界,即上帝之城。我們若欲尋求祂,便需勞力;我們若欲暢飲與祂重聚之蜜,便需熱情;我們若嚐過此杯,便會拋棄塵世。



在本旅程中,行者居無定所,隨處棲身。為尋覓聖友之美,他察看每一張面容;為找到所愛戴者,他走遍每一個國度。他逢人交誼,廣結善緣,以期能從某些心智中發現那聖友的隱秘,或從某些面容中看到所愛者的圣美。



在本旅程中,倘若 他在上帝扶助下發現那無踪蹟之聖友的一絲跡象,自上天使者那裡嗅出失踪已久之約瑟的芳香,便能立即進入

 [自上天使者    [參見《古蘭經》和《聖經·舊約》有關約瑟的故事。]]





愛之谷     


並熔化於愛火之中。在本城,極樂之天冉冉升起,普照世界的渴望之陽熠熠生輝,愛的火焰熊熊燃燒;而愛火一旦燃燒起來,必將理智之果焚為灰燼。


此時此刻,行者已無察自身及周遭之一切。他不分無知和有知、懷疑和確信;他不辨引導之晨與謬誤之夜。他迴避不信和忠信,鴆毒於他不啻藥膏。對此,阿塔爾寫道:
[全名法里德丁·阿塔爾(Farídu’d-Dín ‘Aṭṭár),公元1150-1230年,波斯偉大的蘇非派詩人。]



為不信者準備的,乃是謬誤——為忠信者準備的,乃是信仰;
為阿塔爾之心準備的,乃是你的一絲痛苦。




本谷所需之坐騎乃是痛苦;若無痛苦,
本段旅程便永無終止。
在本站,
除了所愛戴者,
愛者別無所思;
除了聖友,
愛者不尋他庇。
每過一刻,
他在所愛者之道上奉獻百條生命;
每邁一步,
他在所愛者之足下拋舍千顆頭顱。

我的兄弟啊!
若未進入愛的埃及,
你絕不會見到約瑟那聖友之美;
若非如雅各那般放棄自己的外在之眼,
你絕不會睜開自己的內在生命之眼;
若未受到愛火的煎熬,
你絕不會與那渴慕之愛者神交。





愛者無所畏懼,且刀槍不入:
你見他在火中寒顫,在海裡乾涸。

愛者乃是地獄之火中的寒顫之人;

知者乃是浩瀚之海裡的乾涸之士。
[波斯神秘诗。]


愛,無欲求存,不冀求生:
愛者,死中覓生,辱中求榮。
欲達狂愛之境地,便須心智健全;
欲得聖友之交誼,便須靈性充盈。
在愛祂之路上,被祂套索之頸必得福佑,
落地之首必享快樂。
故此,朋友啊,摒棄自我,
你便能發現那蓋世無雙者;
超脫此必朽塵寰,你便能在天堂之巢覓得歸宿。
若欲點燃生命之火,暢行於聖愛之道,
你當淨空自身。



愛不攫取生靈,
鷹不掠食亡鼠。
[波斯神秘詩。可比較阿拉伯文“隱言經”第七首。]


愛,將世界各處點燃;
愛者,使其揚旗之地荒廢。
他的國度已無生命存在;
他的領地已無智者發令。
愛之利維坦吞噬理智之主, 
[利維坦,“聖經”裡講述的一種海中怪獸, 多見於“舊約”的“約伯書”.--譯註]
毀滅知識之君。
他暢飲七海,仍未解心中乾渴,他問:
“還有嗎?”   [“古蘭經”第五十章第29節。]
他自我閉絕,遠離世間一切。

愛絕緣於塵世,也絕緣於天堂。
他一身集七十二種癲狂。

[出自魯米(Jalálu'd-DIN魯米,公元1207至73年年)的詩集“瑪斯納維”(該Mathnaví,意為“心靈對句” - 譯註)。魯米又稱毛拉納(毛拉納,意為“我們的主人。” - 譯註),為最偉大的波斯蘇非派詩人,亦為毛拉維教團(亦稱“旋轉的德爾維希”)的創始人]


無數犧牲者被其鐐銬束縛,
無數睿智者被其利箭傷害。
須知,世界的每片鮮紅皆出自他的憤怒,
世人面頰上的每片蒼白皆緣於他的鴆毒。
他帶來死亡,而非救治;他行走陰谷,別無他途
然而,於愛者之唇,
他的毒液甜過蜜糖,於尋者之眼,
他的毀滅好過千萬條生命。


故而,須以愛火燒毀邪惡自我之面紗,
以使心靈純潔和淨化,
進而能夠認明大千世界之主的地位。

點燃愛火,焚毀一切,
繼而步入愛者之界。
[引自巴哈歐拉的一首頌詩。]

倘若愛者逃離愛之鷹的利爪,且得造物主確認,

他便會進入

Tuesday, December 09, 2014

Why is there no Social Democratic party in Taiwan Politics?

On Monday the 8th of December in our English social work class at Tzu Chi University, we discussed the absence of a leftist party in Taiwan politics, and we especially discussed an article by 吳媛媛.  Taiwan has two coalitions, a "pan-blue" coalition led by the KMT and a "pan-green" coalition led by the DPP, but both of these parties seem to primarily serve the interests of Taiwan businesses and the military and civil servants. The DPP presents itself as more "progressive" than the KMT, and to a limited extent this claim is well-deserved, certainly in terms of social legislation, but neither party has so far shown an interest in making any radical changes to change Taiwan into a society with higher taxes and more government involvement in wealth redistribution.

So, for example, a couple weeks ago in Chiayi City, my wife and I met an 84-year-old woman sitting on the side of the street selling a few fruits and vegetable. My wife recognized her, and the elderly woman soon recognized my wife, whom she had known as a girl. This elderly woman was an acquaintance of my mother-in-law, and had worked in the local park as a groundskeeper at some point in her life, but was now, at her advanced age, sitting by the side of a busy road trying to earn some money selling produce. Then this past weekend I volunteered with some friends from a hiking club with a social agency serving the elderly in Taipei, and we helped clean an apartment in which an 82-year-old man with no family to support him was living.  He had retired at about age 61, and used his retirement money to purchase a car, and had lived out of that car, without a fixed home, for 20 years, until last year when the agency found a small room for him to have a home.  I could go on and list other examples of elderly persons, in their eighties, working hard to make ends meet. The old-age pension in Taiwan is quite small, and not everyone qualifies for it.

So, why isn't there any major political party that represents the interests of the poor and working classes in Taiwan?  Who represents the interests of the many people working in the little shops all along the streets?  Why are both of the major parties in agreement on most policy issues?  As 
吳媛媛 writes, “除了中國議題以外,我感覺不到任何決定性的區別” [Aside from issues concerning China, I can't discern any difference to distinguish the parties].


Taiwan’s “economic miracle” from 1950 to 2000 (but especially from 1970-2000) was based on exports, first agricultural, then industrial, then high tech.  Trade and free trade has formerly been the tool for economic growth, so it would make sense for neoliberal pro-trade ideologies to dominate in Taiwanese politics. And trade has done a fair job of raising the standard of living in Taiwan.  The Taiwanese enjoy about half the per-capita income as Americans, about the same as a poorer European country such as Portugal or Greece. However, since 2000, the vast majority in Taiwan have experienced no increase in their income (just like the lower 80% of the American income distribution, see article by Heidi Shierholz and Lawrence Mishel  or the Frontline article about Two American Families), so perhaps people in Taiwan will question neoliberal assumptions about the value of free trade. The Frozen Garlic blog suggests this may already be happening.

America, like Taiwan, doesn’t really have a left party, as the Democratic Party in the USA is centrist coalition party, although social democrats and socialists in America often support and vote for Democrats since voting for leftist third party candidates splits the vote and makes reactionary Republican victories more likely. Taiwan, likewise, has authentic socialist and social democratic voices, including a genuine Green Party (which won a couple local elections in the recent voting), but these are fringe organizations, and their hostility toward the so-called “communist” regime in Beijing deprives them of support from potential “leftist” sources.

There are many cultural parallels between the USA and Taiwan. It’s worth considering these.

Neither society has a strong leftist political party (although the USA has a strong leftist tradition, and I recommend John Nichol’s flawed by interesting book, “The S Word” for a highly accessible description of Socialism in American history).  Explanations of why a strong labor party never gained power in the USA often observe some of the following: 

In America, everyone wants to be rich, hopes they may become rich, and identifies with the wealthy elites (whom everyone expects someday to join), so a pro-worker party that would constrain capitalists has never been able to emerge as a dominate national political force; 

America has a special history that, until about thirty or forty years ago, made a true leftist party “unnecessary” since the centrist and right-wing parties needed to do relatively little redistribution to keep the electorate happy, as economic growth, special circumstances of being a nation that had experienced ten generations of cheap or free land on a frontier, and other unusual geographical situations distinguished America from Europe. 

American politics have been more dominated by concerns about immigration, religion, American identity, race relations, and foreign policy, and these matters have captured the attention of the electorate, distracting them from issues of economic justice and unfairness in capitalism or income inequality.

American anti-socialist hysteria from the 1920s on through the Cold War made the growth of a true leftist party difficult. The fact that some American leftists were sympathetic to the totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and elsewhere further alienated potential American leftists.

Parallels to Taiwan could include the following:

Taiwan, like the United States, is a society of strivers, where most people hope to be successful in business or in climbing to higher levels social and economic status. As in the United States, Taiwan people may especially admire businessmen, capitalists, and other economic elites, and identify with those persons, either hoping someone in their family will eventually join in such a high level of economic success, or else perhaps in some sort of feeling of deference and obligation to paternalistic bosses who have created wealth for their workers and Taiwan society.

Taiwan was, like the United States, a society without a distant gap between elites and common people.  During the Qing Dynasty, a few wealthy land-owning families may have dominated the society, but for most immigrants from Fujian or elsewhere on the mainland, the society was a relatively egalitarian frontier society.  As with the United States, a certain degree of opportunity existed for people to make a living on land taken from oppressed indigenous persons. Then, when Taiwan became Japanese, all Taiwanese were equally put lower on a hierarchy with the Japanese on top. When Chinese refugees replaced the Japanese as a ruling class of Taiwan, they were hardly a typical ruling class, as many were peasant solders in KMT, with educational and class backgrounds similar to those of the Taiwanese. Additionally, the KMT (with pressure from military and political sponsors in the USA) redistributed land in Taiwan, greatly equalizing opportunities in the agricultural society. These are all unique geographic and historical circumstances that made  the emergence of class consciousness and a leftist party difficult in Taiwan. 

Just as in the United States, where concerns about immigration, race, or military strength distracted people from concerns about issues of wealth redistribution and economic justice, the people of Taiwan also are constantly distracted from meaningful policy issues by the ongoing political controversies concerning superficial matters such as national identity. 吳媛媛 mentions this.  And, while American children probably have better civics education than their Taiwan counterparts, and American schools and universities seemingly put a greater emphasis on public sphere engagement than in test-obsessed Taiwan, both American and Taiwanese education systems do far less than European schools to teach young people about political ideologies, philosophies, or the history of political ideas or class struggles. 

The United States had anti-socialist hysteria in the 1920s and 1950s, and engaged in a cold war against the Soviet Union, but this sort of anti-communism pales in comparison to what Taiwan experienced with the White Terror (the KMT killed off or imprisoned many of the Japanese-educated Taiwanese intelligentsia, as well as anyone suspected of leftist sympathies) and the very real existential threat from so-called “Communist” military forces across the Straits of Formosa. In both the USA and Taiwan, talk of wealth redistribution could be associated with the rhetoric of a potential military enemy that had weapons targeting citizens.

The KMT was initially a broad coalition of military and political leaders, and for a while it included Communist Party members and sympathizers.  The 1927 massacres of leftists and communists initiated by the right-wing of the KMT purged the National Party of leftist elements.  The non-communist leftist faction led by persons such as 馮玉祥, 汪精衛, and 閻錫山 was further discredited when 汪精衛 collaborated with the invading Japanese. Thus, there are specific unique reasons related to interpersonal relationships among KMT leadership, the decisions of Chiang Kai-shek, and the behavior of individuals identified with the leftist wing of the KMT, that made the development of a leftist party in KMT-controlled areas difficult.

吳媛媛 is, I agree, quite right to observe that Taiwanese people are poorly-served by their media.  During the demonstrations around the Legislative Assembly in March and April of this year, I regularly visited the site, and engaged in hours of conversations with demonstrators and visitors to the festive street scene. Over and over again, people repeated this complaint, that they did not understand the policies, and they did not trust the media to give fair explanations of the policies, nor did they trust the government to honestly explain their policies. The sort of people attracted to the demonstration were naturally more skeptical, perhaps even cynical, about government leaders, but still, the protestors all seemed to desire a society where at least some media outlets would offer honest, fair, and critical analysis of policies and proposals, trying to educate the electorate about likely benefits and costs, both the certain and uncertain consequences of legislation or treaties. Everyone I spoke with lacked trust in the KMT or the DPP to give people honest analysis of legislation or treaties.  In particular, I heard from many of the people  a vague sort of class consciousness, as people kept saying they favored trade and development, but they wanted the sort of policies that would offer benefits to most Taiwanese and allow the Taiwanese to preserve their society or culture, and they thought that both parties, but especially the KMT, would be more likely to create legislation and policies that would direct all benefits to those who were already wealthy and powerful, or those who were well-connected to the politicians. 

By the way, 吳媛媛 describes the difference between modern welfare states where the government sector makes up a third to half of the economy and Taiwan, where taxes are very low and government services are minimal. For the percent of the economy under public supervision (Government spending as percent of GDP) there are several sources of data, including the IMF, the OECD, the Economic Freedom Index, the European Union, the United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance, and so forth.  The numbers don’t always agree, and sometimes they fluctuate more than one could imagine possible, so I wonder if one reason the data conflict is that these analyses use different methods for estimating local or provincial/state spending in excess of national government spending. It’s extremely difficult to calculate provincial/state and local spending without double-counting since most national governments allocate money to states and local/tribal governments, and provinces/states also “spend” money by giving it to localities to “spend” again. There are problems with all these data sources.  Anyway, here are two examples, and they are slightly different than the numbers cited by 吳媛媛.

The International Monetary Fund (October of 2012) at The Guardian.
which shows…
France 55%
Sweden 49% 
the UK 45%
USA and Japan 40%
Australia 35%
Taiwan 22%
South Korea 21%
Singapore 18%.

The 2014 Index of Economic Freedom (created by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation, two actors highly biased against government spending) is easily available, and suggests these percentages of the economy under public supervision:
France 56%
Sweden 51% 
the UK 49%
USA and Japan, both around 42%
Australia 35%
Taiwan 23%
South Korea 30%
Singapore 17%.

吳媛媛 was reporting a government sector in Taiwan of about 12.4% of GDP, based on the 2012 Heritage Foundation index of Economic Freedom, but the number of 23% comes from the 2014 report, and there is no way government spending nearly doubled in the past two years!

For critiques of measuring Government percentages of GDP, I recommend 
Dean Baker’s opinion at CEPR (Dean Baker is one of my favorite economists),
which critically discusses Lew Daly’s July 2014 essay in the New York Times, which also critiqued how GDP and government spending are considered.